

9BN at Gallipoli, 25 April 1915: Courage and Professionalism

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At 1:30 a.m. on Sunday 25 April 1915, five hundred soldiers from A and B Companies 9th Battalion, Australian Imperial Force disembarked from the battleship *HMS Queen*. They were part of the first wave of fifteen hundred men from the AIF's 3rd Brigade to invade the Ottoman Empire by landing on the Gallipoli Peninsula at around 4:30 a.m. The Commanding Officer (CO) of 9BN, Lieutenant Colonel H. W. Lee, a schoolteacher by profession with previous service in the militia, disembarked with the first wave. C and D Companies followed as part of the second wave about an hour later.

This was the commencement of 9BN's first campaign in World War I, and what happened on that day and through to November 1915 represents a milestone in the battalion's history. Not only was it the first time that the volunteers who made up the battalion experienced the stark realities of combat, it was also the initial trial of their capability and professionalism. Although they were relatively young and confident in their ability this was, for all but a handful, their baptism of fire. Compared to the Western Front it was a relatively small prelude but it was a unique event with its own set of challenges. For the first time, officers and NCOs of 9BN were placed in a situation where their leadership as well as their tactical and administrative skills were truly tested. Adding to the challenges 9BN confronted was the fact that the attack launched against the Turks on the shores of Gallipoli was made by an amphibious landing, described by Lieutenant General William Birdwood as one of the most difficult tasks any soldier can be called on to perform.¹ It was to be the initial test of the battalion's capacity in battle. Were they capable and professional? Or were they simply an armed force of enthusiastic amateurs ill-suited for the tasks ahead?

As part of the invasion plan men boarded 'tows,' each consisting of three or four lifeboats carrying thirty to forty men towed by a small steamboat to a point offshore. There the lifeboats were released and then rowed in the last dash to the planned point of landing. It was dark and not a word was spoken above a whisper.² Understandably the suspense in the crowded boats was trying.³ At

4:30 a.m., Private Frank Holloway from Roma, Queensland, was among the first group of 9BN soldiers to land at what was to become known as Anzac Cove. In many ways Frank Holloway's story is an exemplar of the experiences and competence of many of the soldiers of 9BN who fought at Gallipoli. Under intense Turkish fire, Holloway leapt out of the boat into the water and followed Lieutenant Roberts, the commander of 6 Platoon, across the beach. According to reports the water was deep and cold and some men drowned. Others were hit by Turkish fire before they left the boats, while in the water or crossing the beach. With other members of 6 Platoon Holloway staggered across about ten yards of beach to cover on a stretch of sand under a high bank. Private Percival Young, also of 9BN, recalled his experience:

Bullets splashed all around the boats and tore through the woodwork. The pack on my back was torn with bullets but I was untouched [...] A seaman seized an oar to push the boat further in, and, as he pushed, fell dead, shot through the head. [...] those who were able, sprang into the water, helter-skelter, pell-mell out of the boats. The water was up to our necks, but stumbling and wading we reached the shore, and rushed for any bit of cover.⁴

Adding to the challenge was the weight of their equipment. A complete set meant that each soldier had to carry over eighty pounds (36 kg). Alongside each man's rifle this included two extra days' rations, a tin of bully beef, a small tin of tea and sugar and a number of hard coarse biscuits, two hundred rounds of ammunition, a full water bottle, a heavy pack crammed with his uniform and two empty sandbags.⁵ Assaulting the beach under enemy fire while carrying such a weight was a test of their fitness.

Under the cover of the high bank, soldiers of 9BN followed orders by dropping their packs and fixing bayonets.⁶ Because of the darkness it was difficult to see what was happening; to make the situation more confusing, as the light improved it became evident that the first wave had landed at the wrong location. A navigational error had occurred during the tow from *HMS Queen* to the planned landing point. The plan had been for 9BN to form up under the protection of a high bank and to attack the first ridge across an area of open ground. There was, however, no open ground and the bank being used for cover from Turkish fire was the lower portion of a high, steep, rugged hill. Instead of landing north of Gabe Tepe and south of 400 Plateau they had landed about a mile north of the intended landing place, in an area adjacent to the headland of Ari Burnu. This confused officers and men: instead of facing a gently sloping topography, with a reasonable

climb to the first ridge, the troops found themselves facing something which resembled a wall about three hundred feet high.⁷ While the soldiers were in the process of orienting themselves, the Turks concentrated their fire on the area where 9BN had assembled. To add to the confusion, men from the 9th, 10th and 11th Battalions had become intermingled.

Given the circumstances faced by the soldiers of A and B Companies and their comrades from the 10th and 11th Battalions, combined with their inexperience, it would not have been a surprise if a sense of panic prevailed. To their credit they remained disciplined and focused on their objective of continuing to advance to make a clearer way for the main body's landing. In doing so, soldiers of 9BN had obeyed their brigade commander, Colonel Sinclair-MacLagan's special order which had been read to them on the morning of 24 April:

It is necessary you should understand that we are to carry out a most difficult operation. There is no going back. Whatever footing we get on land must be held at all costs, even to the last man. We must expect to be shelled but remember, this is part of the game of war and we must stick it. You may get orders to do something, which, in your position, seems wrong and perhaps a mad enterprise. Do not cavil on it but carry it out with absolute faith in your leadership because we are, after all, only a very small piece on the board. Some pieces have to be sacrificed to win the game and it is to win the game that we are here.⁸

To achieve their objective soldiers of 9BN climbed to the top of the hill in front of them. It was steep and covered in small prickly bushes of dwarf oak about three feet high, and to make the climb men had to use their rifle butts to balance and the stems and roots of the scrub to haul themselves up. As they struggled up the slope they were seen by the Turks and many were shot. Among the wounded were some who remained there throughout the day. A fierce and deadly encounter followed with Turkish soldiers scattering through the steep scrub covered cliffs as they were attacked by 9BN, and other soldiers from the 3rd Brigade. John Masefield described this event as the scene of most desperate fighting.⁹

Lieutenant Roberts led 6 Platoon up the hillside to the top of Plugge's Plateau. Holloway respected Roberts' leadership and professionalism, and with other members of the platoon followed his commander all the way to the top. In a letter to his parents dated 2 June 1915, later published in the *Western Star and Roma Advertiser*, Frank gave the following account of his and one his mates' experiences:

I am quite alright and just about getting used to trench life. I have had a few narrow escapes. The morning of landing I got a bullet through the shoulder of my tunic, and another hit my rifle stock, knocking a piece off and a third hit the brace of my web equipment and glanced off [...] Arthur Harley is or was at Malta with a slight injury to his back. On the day of our landing he was lying on a bit of a bank, when a shell hit the bank throwing him on his back. I was not with him at the time, we had become separated owing to the thick scrub [...].¹⁰

The fighting on 25 April, both on the shoreline and in the first line of hills, could be seen by British sailors and officers on the ships from which the 3rd Brigade had disembarked. It provided an opportunity for the Australians to demonstrate their capability as soldiers. Admiral Wemyss was so impressed that in a discussion with an Australian officer afterwards he said, “[Y]our men are not soldiers, they are fiends. I have seen many famous regiments charging, but I have never seen fighting like this. Your men will do me. It would give me great pleasure to lead them into action at any time.”¹¹

The aggression shown by the soldiers of 9BN that day was arguably the result of the leadership and initiative of a number of their officers and NCOs at critical times. Intermingling affected the ability to manage and control the attack, and the Australians from the 3rd Brigade quickly understood the importance of both leadership and initiative. Two groups were informally established, “leaders and followers,” and “[t]hose in institutional positions of leadership did not have the opportunity of following – they either led or they failed, and there was no moment during the war when the gulf between the most and least competent COs was so great.”¹²

After the landing Lieutenant Colonel Lee, CO of 9BN, could not be located and from all accounts was not in practical command from early on 25 April. Responsibility for leadership of 9BN thus fell mainly on the shoulders of platoon and company commanders. The leadership demonstrated by Captain Graham Butler, 9BN’s Medical Officer, was notable. While attending to the wounded on the beach, Butler saw a group of men firing their rifles up the hill towards the Turks. He realised that these men had lost contact with their officers and required leadership. He urged the men to fix bayonets and with revolver in hand he personally led them up the steep incline to Plugge’s Plateau. Private Percival Young was among the group of men who followed. In a *School Paper* later prepared for the Queensland Department of Education, he described how the soldiers led by Butler felt when they saw the effect Turkish shrapnel was having on the boats of men continuing to arrive at the landing point:

The sight maddened us. “On Queenslanders” came the cry and with bayonets fixed we rushed for the Turkish positions. We pressed forward till it seemed we must drop from exhaustion. Then we saw the enemy coming in force. Taking advantage of every bit of cover available we emptied our magazines into them again and again. The Turks fell like leaves but still more came on. Men dropped and numbers began to weaken. “Where are the others? Have we come too far?” were the questions in the minds of all.¹³

Upon arrival at Plugge’s Plateau 6 Platoon joined other men from A and B Companies and soldiers from the 10th and 11th Battalions. Unfortunately for A and B Companies, both arrived without their company commanders. Major J.C. Robertson had been wounded and Major S.B. Robertson, along with a few of his men, was killed at Baby 700, a hill located about fifteen hundred yards north-east of Plugge’s Plateau. This meant that both companies had lost their most senior officers, and with the CO nowhere to be seen the responsibility for 9BN’s overall command fell on the shoulders of Major A.G. Salisbury, the most junior major in the battalion. The level of responsibility placed on his shoulders should not be underestimated, particularly given that it occurred early on 9BN’s first day in battle, which from dawn had been brutal. Major Salisbury led the battalion for the remainder of 25 April. He split the soldiers of 9BN, who had arrived at Plugge’s Plateau, into two separate groups described as the left group and the right group. He assumed responsibility for the right group and handed over command of the left group to Captain J.F. Ryder. As Turkish forces withdrew from the plateau and retreated down the valley to the south east, orders were given by Salisbury to pursue them into the valley.

While this was happening on Plugge’s Plateau, C and D Companies, part of the 3rd Brigade’s second wave, arrived at their landing points. For D Company this was Little Ari Burnu (afterwards known as “Queensland Point” or “Hell’s Spit”) seven hundred and fifty yards (685 metres) south of Ari Burnu. For C Company, it was about three to four hundred yards further south opposite Victoria Gully and Clarke’s Gully. Like A and B Companies, their landing point was inconsistent with the plan but unlike A and B Companies the area from the beach was not so steep. However, they were confronted by Turkish soldiers in defensive positions within sixty yards of their landing points. Some of the defenders were in trenches, while others were firing from the cover of the undergrowth. Immediately on landing, C and D Companies went on the attack. They dumped their packs and under the leadership of Captains Milne and Jackson launched an assault and went to the top of what was named

M'Cay's Hill, which was about seven hundred and fifty yards south of A and B Companies' location. This was a period of intense fighting, and in his diary entry of 25 April Lieutenant Ross described the ordeal:

[A]rrive there about dawn and enemy opens fire while we are getting off the boats. push ashore and sweep the first opposition aside or before us but line of entrenchments hold up the attack and from then on the slaughter grows apace – troops try to go forward in the face of lead – machine guns and shrapnel mow men down – wounded go back in droves many get a taste of fire on beach – a real hell of a day's work, going on all night to be ready for enemy on the morrow – one officer describes beach as a butcher's shop.¹⁴

The landing of C and D Companies completed the first step of 9BN's introduction to war. It was not only Admiral Wemyss who was impressed by their performance. Vice-Admiral de Robeck, commander of the allied naval force in the Dardanelles, wrote:

At Gaba Tepe the landing and dash of the Australian Brigade for the cliffs was magnificent – nothing could stop such men. The Australian and New Zealand Army Corps in this, their first battle, set a standard as high as that of any army in history, and one of which their countrymen have any reason to be proud.¹⁵

While C and D Companies advanced towards M'Cay's Hill, Major Salisbury led A and B Companies across Shrapnel Gully toward 400 Plateau and continued to follow the retreating Turks. Salisbury and the soldiers under his command climbed the steep ridge back to a point on the far side, slightly north of Owen's Gully. At the same time Lieutenant Thomas and his D company platoon surprised a party of Turks who were in the process of loading machine guns onto mules. After a short skirmish Lieutenant Thomas's platoon captured the Turkish guns, the first to be captured at Gallipoli.

On arrival at 400 Plateau Major Salisbury gathered together the scattered men from 9BN and followed an order from Sinclair-MacLagan not to advance to the third ridge but to dig in on the second ridge and reorganise. That was the first of many orders given that changed the original plan. However, the order did not reach all the advanced parties, and a detachment of 9BN soldiers under the command of Captain Ryder continued on to the third ridge where they could see what they believed was the Sea of Marmara. Ryder had obeyed the initial order, and in doing so his party and a party under the command of Lieutenant E.C. Plant, together with a detachment from the 10th Battalion, had stuck to the original operational plan.¹⁶ Between

8:00 and 9:00 a.m. on 25 April, then, this small group of soldiers reached the nearest point to the Dardanelles ever to be attained by Allied troops during the campaign. Although a remarkable achievement, it turned out to be a short stay. Under serious threat from a superior force of Turkish defenders the three parties of Australians were forced to withdraw from the third ridge back to 400 Plateau.

At the same time that A and B Companies were on their way to, or digging in on, 400 Plateau, C and D Companies were engaged in separate contacts with Turkish defenders which caused further changes to 9BN's chain of command. Captain Jackson, commander of D Company, was wounded on the way from the beach to 400 Plateau and Captain Dougall assumed command of part of the Company, which met a detachment of C Company who were also on their way to the Plateau. Both parties managed to reach the southern or Lone Pine end of the Plateau. On arrival Captain Milne, commander of C Company, was wounded by Turkish gunfire coming from a trench where Bolton's Ridge joined 400 Plateau. Corporal Harrison and a section of soldiers were sent by Milne to eradicate the threat. The trench was quickly taken and the small number of Turkish soldiers in it were killed or captured. Although Harrison was successful, C Company suffered a further blow when Captain Milne was hit several times and his second-in-command, Captain Fisher, wounded as they entered the trench. Despite his wounds Milne led his men from the trench and headed east towards Turkish guns located at The Cup.

As Captain Milne headed to The Cup, Captain Dougall, in a display of courage and leadership, called out to his men "come on, boys," and led a small group of D Company at the run along Bolton's Ridge in the direction of Gabe Tepe. Lieutenant Chambers was wounded on the way and thus became another casualty in the officer ranks. The group found an empty trench line near Bolton's Hill and from there Dougall saw a large force of Turkish soldiers moving along the third ridge. As a result, he made the decision to withdraw his men back to 400 Plateau to the area where Major Salisbury had been digging in. As soon as he arrived Dougall reported the movement of the Turks to the brigade commander. After receiving the report Sinclair-MacLagan, apparently fearing an overwhelming Turkish counter-attack, ordered Major Salisbury to leave the area where his men had been digging in, and to move forward on a section-by-section basis to counter the Turkish attack. This occurred between 10 a.m. and 12 noon at a time when Salisbury had managed to group together about half of the battalion under his command.

When an assessment of 9BN's capability and professionalism is made, it is important to note that the breakup into sections increased the level of responsibility of the corporals in command of the sections

as well as their platoon commanders and platoon sergeants. It is also a prime example of the level of confidence Colonel Sinclair-MacLagan had in the capability of the battalion's NCOs. As the sections moved forward, the Turks deployed from the third ridge and advanced towards 400 Plateau in extended order. Fire fights broke out as the sections progressed through the scrub and they were met with sustained fire from rifles and machine guns. This caused the sections to become scattered and intermixed and the advance towards the Turks more difficult. As they advanced, Salisbury's men joined others from 9BN including Captain Milne and his party who were also advancing through the scrub. Casualty rates were high and included Major Salisbury who was wounded in the hand.

Under heavy fire, a sustained Turkish attack and a breakdown in communications, soldiers under the command of either Major Salisbury or Captain Milne managed to withdraw in separate groups to The Cup. The battalion's position was volatile and vulnerable, and it was suffering heavy losses. Not only was it impossible to organise a line of defence; it was also very difficult to maintain communications. The separation of the sections added another problem to the situation:

Corporal Harrison and his section were on the extreme right [...] and isolated, and they did not see the Turkish attack. Not hearing of the withdrawal, they stayed on. In the meantime the others had retired to a position about fifty yards in front of the Turkish guns at The Cup. [And] at some little distance to the right of [Salisbury and Milne's] position were the two machine-guns of the 9th under Lieutenant Costin, but he knew nothing of the whereabouts of the rest of the 9th nor of the existence of any firing line.¹⁷

After 11 a.m. Turkish mountain guns opened fire on 400 Plateau while Turkish soldiers continued their advance. Salisbury had sent messengers back requesting reinforcements, but his messengers never returned, nor did reinforcements arrive. In consultation with Milne a decision was made by Salisbury to withdraw to the summit of Lone Pine about 275 metres to their rear. Milne, who had been wounded three times earlier, was wounded twice more. He described what happened in a letter sent back to Australia:

A man lying next to me got killed, and I put out my left hand to take his rifle to have a shot and just as I did so a shell burst right overhead and hit me across the fingers, smashing the stock of the rifle to splinters, so I didn't have a shot at that time. I got out my field dressing and tied them up and carried on, but very soon after a six-inch shell got to business and a piece of it ripped through the back of my upper left arm.¹⁸

In a display of leadership, courage, and resilience Milne continued to lead the men under his command until he collapsed and was thought to have died. He was later carried to the beach where he was found to be alive. Milne was no enthusiastic amateur: before he enlisted in 9BN on 20 August 1914 he had been an officer in the Wide Bay Regiment 1st Battalion (later the 4th Battalion) from 1908. His performance on 25 April is an indicator of the level of capability and professionalism that existed in the officers of 9BN's original contingent.

Under sustained enemy fire Salisbury led his men closer to Lieutenant Costin's machine-guns and remained there for most of the day as casualties increased. Captain Melbourne was wounded in the head; Lieutenant Chambers was also wounded and Lieutenant Costin was killed by a shell which also destroyed one of the machine-guns. His death meant that Sergeant Steele continued to work the remaining machine-gun on his own. The rest of the machine-gun section were casualties and for his service that day Steele was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal for gallantry and from 28 April 2015 was commissioned to the rank of second lieutenant. His performance is also an example of the level of capability that existed in 9BN's original contingent of NCOs. His military career commenced in 1910 in the South Australian Infantry Regiment, and from qualifying school he was appointed to the Administrative and Instructional Staff of the Permanent Military Forces. In January 1911 Steele was promoted to staff sergeant major and in 1912 qualified at the Permanent Military Forces School of Musketry. In 1913 he was posted to the Royal Military College, Duntroon as the non-commissioned officer in infantry and musketry. When visiting Brisbane on 25 August 1914 Steele enlisted in 9BN.¹⁹

By 1 p.m. it appeared as though the Turks had gained the upper hand and the Australians, including 9BN, withdrew back to a defence line which became their permanent position until August 1915. Many believed 'the game was up,' however very few Turks made it to 400 Plateau and those who did were wiped out by fire as effective as their own. Private Percival Young described the withdrawal:

Then the order came to retire steadily; bullets flicked all round us; many of the boys fell, and we had to leave them. Slowly and steadily we fell back to the shelter of the captured trenches. Then the battleships began to open out on the advancing Turkish hordes. The *Queen Elizabeth*, *Triumph*, *London*, *Canopus*, *Swiftsure*, *Majestic*, a Russian battleship, and a number of destroyers poured an avalanche of shell, and the Turks crumpled up [...] All that day, and all through the night the awful din continued. Water was scarce, wounded and dying

men were all around us, and our rifle-barrels grew red-hot with the continuous firing.²⁰

As 9BN withdrew Lieutenant Thomas's shoulder was seriously wounded by shrapnel and he handed over his area of the line of defence to the 2nd Brigade, which, after landing, had been sent to provide support to the 3rd Brigade. Lieutenant Hayman was killed later in the day. Major Salisbury, who had led the battalion from early on the day, was wounded, dazed, and reportedly exhausted. After the line of defence was established at mid-afternoon, he retired to the dressing station on the beach and returned to 9BN the next day. Salisbury had been an active militia soldier and a captain in the 7th Infantry (Moreton) Regiment. After enlisting in 9BN as one of the original officers he was appointed as company commander of A Company. He was recommended for a decoration on three occasions for his service at Gallipoli.²¹

The reorganisation of 9BN into individual sections, which often had to operate independently, makes writing a connected story of the battalion's performance on 25 April difficult. The ability of 9BN soldiers to fight effectively on their first day in battle when reorganised this way does, however, provide evidence of the level of capability that existed amongst the battalion's company, platoon and section commanders. Their capacity to confront the Turks when separated on this basis was recognised by New Zealanders who praised the Australians of the 3rd Brigade. Richard Ward, a sergeant in the Auckland Battalion wrote, "[all] along the beach were dead and dying Australians (3rd Brigade) who had landed at dawn with splendid courage and drove the Turks back over the ridge of hills."²² Letters and diaries of the New Zealanders also praised the Australian effort, "[no] orders, no proper military teamwork, no instructions. Just absolute heroism."²³ The characteristics of resilience, skill, courage, determination and leadership carried ashore by soldiers of the 3rd Brigade in their personal 'kitbags' were openly recognised and admired by their New Zealand comrades.

It was not only the New Zealanders who praised the performance of soldiers in the 3rd Brigade. The efforts of 9BN were acknowledged by Lieutenant Prisk, when his platoon from the 6th Battalion, 2nd Brigade was sent to help guard the right flank of 9BN. As he progressed up to the top of Bolton's Ridge, he was joined by men from 9BN. "Grand lads", he said, "eager for anything – it was a job to keep them back."²⁴ On 27 April General Birdwood's message to the 3rd Brigade was received by 9BN. He said "[w]ell done, Third Bde., you have done magnificently, we are all proud of you."²⁵

On 25 April 9BN's casualty rates were high. The exact number

of losses that occurred on that day is unknown, for it was not until 30 April that a parade of the battalion was held on the beach, after the 3rd Brigade had been recalled for the reserve. A total of 429 (ten officers and 419 other ranks) attended, which meant that the battalion's casualties up to noon on 30 April were nineteen officers and 496 other ranks. When considered with the fact that 1,037 original members of the battalion had sailed from Brisbane on 24 September 1914, the casualty rate was devastating and traumatic for those who attended the parade. Private Percival Young recorded the effect it had on him:

On Friday we had a muster and the roll was called. The diminished numbers of the 9th were enough to sadden the stoutest heart. Stragglers who came in from time to time were greeted with cheers and hearty handshakes; but when all were told there were but some 420 officers and men effective out of our battalion of 1,000.²⁶

By mid-November 1915 the Gallipoli campaign resulted in 9BN suffering 633 casualties, of whom 233 had been killed in action or died of wounds. The battalion had played a leading role in an early bloody episode in what was to be a bloody and protracted war.²⁷

The Anzac legend has become a matter of contention. To many it is a legend and to others a myth, but for the men of 9BN who landed at Gallipoli on 25 April 1915 it was neither. Their performance that day was one of capability, professionalism, courage, and sacrifice. Their example was one of the reasons why the ADF in 2011 recommended that contemporary soldiers should emulate the performance of the Anzacs.²⁸ But while the traits of mateship and egalitarianism were characteristics of many of the soldiers in 9BN, they were arguably not the major factors that underpinned the battalion's performance. To say that they were disregards the fact that many of the men in 9BN had months, years or even decades of military training behind them. It ignores the history of the battalion, and underplays the level of military skills and professionalism which had been accrued by units in the battalion's lineage over a considerable period. Soldiers in the battalion were not as amateurish as has often been suggested.²⁹

Notes

¹ General W. Birdwood, in AWM 4, 23/1/3, Part 3.

² N.H. Harvey, *From Anzac to the Hindenburg Line: The History of the 9th Battalion, A.I.F.* (London: Imperial War Museum, 1940), p. 39.

³ Harvey, *From Anzac to the Hindenburg Line*, p. 39.

⁴ C.M. Wrench, *Campaigning with the Fighting 9th: In and Out of the Line with the 9BN A.I.F. 1914 -1919* (Brisbane: Boolarong, 1985), p. 70.

⁵ Wrench, *Campaigning with the Fighting 9th*, p. 51.

⁶ A. Holloway, *Duty Nobly Done* (Moss Vale: Big Sky Publishing, 2018), p. 27.

⁷ D.W. Cameron, *25 April 1915, The Day the Anzac Legend was Born* (Crows Nest: Allen and Unwin, 2007), p. xxiii.

⁸ Cameron, *25 April 1915*, p. 21.

⁹ J. Masfield, *Gallipoli* (London: William Heinemann, 1918), p. 38.

¹⁰ 'Our Volunteers,' *Western Star and Roma Advertiser*, 31 July 1915, p. 3.

¹¹ Harvey, *From Anzac to the Hindenburg Line*, p. 45.

¹² W.F. Westerman, 'Soldiers and Gentlemen: Australian Battalion Commanders in the Great War 1914-1918' (PhD thesis, University of New South Wales, 2014), p. 92.

¹³ Wrench, *Campaigning with the Fighting 9th*, p. 70.

¹⁴ Wrench, *Campaigning with the Fighting 9th*, p. 57.

¹⁵ Harvey, *From Anzac to the Hindenburg Line*, p. 45.

¹⁶ Harvey, *From Anzac to the Hindenburg Line*, p. 49.

¹⁷ Harvey, *From Anzac to the Hindenburg Line*, p. 51.

¹⁸ Harvey, *From Anzac to the Hindenburg Line*, p. 52.

¹⁹ C.D. Coulthard-Clark, 'Steele, Alexander' in John Ritchie (Gen. Ed.), *Australian Dictionary of Biography* Vol. 12: 1891-1939 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1990).

²⁰ Wrench, *Campaigning with the Fighting 9th*, p. 70.

²¹ Peter Burness, 'Salisbury, Alfred George' in Geoffrey Serle (Gen. Ed.), *Australian Dictionary of Biography* Vol. 11: 1891-1939 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1988).

²² C. Pugsley, *Gallipoli: The New Zealand Story* (Auckland: Oratia Books, 2016), p. 122.

²³ Pugsley, *Gallipoli*, p. 122.

²⁴ Harvey, *From Anzac to the Hindenburg Line*, p. 54.

²⁵ Harvey, *From Anzac to the Hindenburg Line*, p. 57.

²⁶ Wrench, *Campaigning with the Fighting 9th*, p. 71.

²⁷ R. Prior, *Gallipoli: The End of the Myth* (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2009), p. xvi.

²⁸ 'Beyond Compliance – Professionalism, Trust and Capability in the Australian Profession of Arms,' Report of the ADF Personal Conduct Review, 2011.

²⁹ The author's Masters of Philosophy research project, presently being conducted in the School of Historical and Philosophical Inquiry at the University of Queensland, investigates the military professionalism of 9BN AIF from the formation of its antecedent unit in 1867.