

The Solomons at War: Impacts and Legacies

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The Solomon Islands, east of Papua New Guinea and north-east of Australia, comprise of over 900 islands scattered over approximately 28,000 square kilometres in the South Pacific, and with more than eighty different languages spoken among its people.¹ Following the December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, Japan dropped its first bomb on the Solomons on Gavutu in the Nggela Islands (also known as the Florida Islands) on 22 January 1942, bringing the Solomon Islands into the forefront of World War II.²

Japanese troops arrived at Tulagi on 3 May 1942, but found it was a ghost town. By then, “the colonial administration had relocated to Auki on Malaita and nearly all European civilians had been evacuated to Australia.”³ Japanese forces were unopposed in the Solomon Islands for over three months after their landing at Tulagi, and during this time were able to build an airfield on Guadalcanal.⁴ Even before the completion of this airfield, Allied powers knew “there would be grave danger that the American supply lines to Australia would be cut. Furthermore, it was not too unreasonable to suspect that these airfields might be used as advance bases for an invasion of the Australian mainland.”⁵

Later that year, on 7 August 1942, 11,000 men of the United States First Marine Division, under the command of Major General Alexander Vandegrift, landed on Guadalcanal and Tulagi, with the objective to capture the airfield. The landing marked the beginning of the Solomon Islands campaign.⁶ The US Marines expanded the primitive Japanese airfield and renamed it Henderson Field, after a US flyer killed in the battle of Midway.⁷ American forces then advanced northward along the chain of islands. However, the occupying Japanese slowly reorganised and launched a full-scale but unsuccessful counter-offensive in March 1944, resulting in approximately 5,000 Japanese casualties.⁸ The campaign lasted for over a year and resulted in the deaths of 23,000 Japanese and 1,600 American soldiers.⁹

This article highlights the contributions of Solomon Islanders to the Allied victory. Solomon Islander involvement occurred through enlistment as a part of the Coastwatchers network, the Solomon

Islands Defence Force or Solomon Islands Labour Force, or through being entrusted as a scout for Allied troops. There were cases, however, of collaboration and coercion that should also be considered. The final part of the article will discuss the aftermath of the Solomon Islands campaign, particularly on the environment. The war left parts of the Solomon Islands battered and unsafe for inhabitants, due to land degradation and discarded military explosives, initiating problems that continue to the present day.

The focus here is on events on Buka and Bougainville, which are geographically part of the Solomons Islands but part of the League of Nations Mandated Territory, controlled by Australia, rather than the pre-war British Solomon Islands Protectorate. In colonial terms, they were different territories, however, during the Solomon Islands campaign, the war was fought across colonial boundaries, hence the need to include these islands.

Solomon Islanders as Coastwatchers

With the Japanese invasion, some Europeans living in the Solomon Islands stayed behind to enlist with the Royal Australian Navy's Coastwatching network and went into hiding in the jungles of Guadalcanal and other islands. With the assistance of Solomon Islanders, they spied and reported on Japanese activities.¹⁰

The concept behind the Coastwatchers had emerged in Australia after World War I. Captain C.J. Clare, a district naval officer in Western Australia, proposed a national security initiative: a secret intelligence network to gather information on any subversive or suspicious developments near coastal areas of Australia.¹¹ This idea stemmed from the problem of protecting Australia's undefended coastline.¹² During World War I, enemy forces may have been able to operate without hindrance and without being discovered.¹³ Following this security initiative, a staff paper was submitted to the chief of staff at the navy headquarters in Melbourne, with this paper also suggesting the network be extended to include Papua and New Guinea and the Solomon Islands.¹⁴

By September 1939, the Coastwatchers network consisted of 800 members, most of them on the Australian mainland.¹⁵ With the outbreak of World War II, Commander Eric Feldt was the head of this network.¹⁶ Commander Feldt chose the code word 'Ferdinand' for the Coastwatching network, based on the children's book *The Story of Ferdinand* that inspired an animated short film in 1938. Besides the name serving as a cloak of secrecy, it was also to remind Coastwatchers of their duty not to fight and draw attention to themselves. Just like the Disney character, who sat under a tree and smelled the flowers, Coastwatchers were to sit, circumspectly and

unobtrusively, and gather information: like Ferdinand, if they fought they might get stung.¹⁷

Many of the Coastwatchers enlisted during World War II were European, such as Lieutenant D.S. Macfarlan, Lieutenant F.A. 'Snowy' Rhoades, Martin Clemens, Paul Mason, Henry Josselyn and Jack Read. However, out of the hundreds of Coastwatchers only three were Solomon Islanders: Hugh Wheatley, Geoffrey Kuper and Harry Wickham. The three men were of mixed racial heritage, with a Caucasian father and a local mother.¹⁸ This mixed heritage was important, as it enabled them to be appointed to this position of authority over other native Solomon Islanders.¹⁹

Hugh Wheatley, a Native Medical Practitioner (NMP) by profession, was appointed a Coastwatcher by Donald Kennedy. In early March 1942, Wheatley received reports regarding an outbreak of Spanish influenza in the Shortland Islands. Equipped with a radio given to him by Kennedy, Wheatley travelled to the Shortland Islands to assess the situation and treat the victims.²⁰ Joseph Alene, a local dresser, was also sent to help treat the victims, and John "Dutchy" Klaucke, who was to transport the two men to the Shortland Islands.²¹ However, upon arriving at the Shortland Islands, the three were set upon by Japanese forces. Klaucke was never seen again, and Alene escaped capture and paddled at night via Fauro to Choiseul.²² There are conflicting reports on what happened to Wheatley. One account is that upon arrival to the island, he was taken prisoner by Japanese troops on 6 April 1942, and sent to Rabaul, where he remained in a Japanese military prison, providing medical assistance to wounded and sick prisoners until his death in May 1944.²³ Another account is that he was sent to Rabaul but never made it, as the prisoner-of-war vessel he was travelling on, the *Montevideo Maru*, was torpedoed by an American submarine.²⁴

A second Solomons man, Geoffrey Kuper, was appointed as a Coastwatcher by Martin Clemens, and was assigned under Kennedy to run the coastwatching station on Isabel Island at Tataba in August 1942.²⁵ Kuper planned and executed operations with his scouts, organised search and rescue missions, carried out guerrilla attacks against the Japanese, and ensured the safe return of rescued airmen and sailors to Allied bases.²⁶ His first report to Kennedy was of Japanese survivors near a sunken destroyer, with Kuper then organising for some of his scouts to kill many of them.²⁷ Finally, Harry Wickham, who was a trader and plantation manager in Roviana Lagoon, was also appointed as a Coastwatcher by Kennedy.²⁸ He organised islanders for scouting and reconnaissance, helped rescue fallen pilots and sailors, reported enemy movements and developments, and also assisted in the evacuation of rescued Allied

personnel.²⁹ Wickham was stationed at New Georgia, which ultimately became a “safe haven” for Allied personnel. Walter Lord wrote that Wickham “knew every foot of the area...if anybody could find the right spot for watching the Japanese at Munda, he would be the one.”³⁰

Solomon Islanders as scouts and labourers

But behind all Coastwatchers situated in the Solomon Islands was a large force of scouts who, arguably, were the reason for the success of coastwatching operations. These men were recruited by district officers and enlisted into the British Solomon Islands Defence Force, forming two categories of the scouting network: armed and unarmed forces. Armed scouts were made up of police constables who had served in the British Solomon Islands Police Force prior to the war, and most of them had training in handling firearms. Unarmed scouts were recruited over the course of the Solomon Islands campaign, especially when there was an increased need for swift intelligence reporting.³¹

The scouting network had three significant tasks. Firstly, intelligence gathering, with the most common example being Coastwatchers sending their scouts to seek employment at Japanese camps. Scouts would masquerade as willing civilian helpers, helping Japanese soldiers unload cargo and military equipment, before reporting back. Martin Clemens reported one scout had returned from a reconnaissance mission with unusually detailed intelligence. When asked about how the scout received this information, the scout replied, “I wanted to know exactly what they got, so I helped them unload it.”³² Another example includes Lieutenant Macfarlan sending his cook to the Japanese camp, where he obtained work as a labourer before reporting back on armaments and progress made on the airfield in Tulagi.³³ “Snowy” Rhoades sent his scouts to work at the Japanese airfield and to barter food, and received reports about the Japanese force stationed there.³⁴ Geoffrey Kuper was also supported by twelve volunteer scouts including former police officers such as Sergeant Tanisapa of Kia and Corporal John Legusuga of Buala.³⁵ Another task for scouts was relaying information to the Coastwatchers, such as reporting sightings of Japanese forces and passing on classified information between the Coastwatchers.³⁶ Solomon Islanders who were involved in these tasks include John Kari, Daniel Gua and Micah Mae.³⁷

Search and rescue were other tasks for scouts, with the most famous story being the rescue of Lieutenant John F. Kennedy, naval officer and future President of the United States. On the night of 1 August 1943, Kennedy and his boat PT-109, among fourteen other PT

boats, were sent on a reconnaissance mission but the Japanese destroyer *Amagiri* rammed the PT-109, throwing Kennedy and his crew overboard. Kennedy and his crew swam ashore and four days later, local scouts Erori Kumana and Biuku Gasa found them. Kennedy tried to find a piece of paper to write a message to the nearest coastwatcher when Kumana gave him a coconut husk instead.³⁸ By 8 August 1943, Kennedy and his crew were safely at the U.S. base at Rendova.³⁹ To summarise just how important scouts were during the Solomon Islands campaign, Feldt states that, “Without the natives and without the help of the Ferdinand headquarters, the Coastwatchers could never have existed in the enemy held islands, let alone have done their dangerous work. For no one can live in the jungle without aid.”⁴⁰

Guerrilla warfare was another task, but only for armed scouts. The exploits of Solomon Islander Steven Vinale Zaku were so effective that Japanese military eventually sent an expedition to the Solomon Islands in 1973 to search for the twenty-five missing Japanese soldiers killed by Zaku himself.⁴¹ Another key individual was Daniel Kalea, who enlisted as a scout and worked alongside the U.S. Marine raiders on Guadalcanal. Kalea was compelled to join the war when his wife was killed by Japanese forces during operations on Guadalcanal in mid-1942. With the opportunity to take revenge with impunity, Kalea engaged in a private quest for vengeance in guerrilla skirmishes.⁴² An important division also involved in guerrilla warfare was the Solomon Islands Defence Force. It was originally established by the Defence Force Regulation of 1939 in order to work out defence schemes with the armed Constabulary.⁴³ But as the fighting continued, US troops made known their desire for trained Solomon Islanders who could operate as scouts with US Marine patrols.⁴⁴ By 1942, the Defence Force included 23 officers, 49 European NCOs, 36 Fijian NCOs, 18 Solomon Islands NCOs, and 216 Solomon Islands privates.⁴⁵ George Maelalo was involved in the Defence Force for three years, and was one of the twenty-three men who followed the fighting even after the Defence Force had been disbanded.⁴⁶

After the disbandment, Maelalo was recruited into the Fiji Commando unit to go further north.⁴⁷ Arnon Ngwadili, who was a former policeman before the war, was also recruited into the Defence Force in 1939 and sent to Tulagi on Nggela where he was trained to fight.⁴⁸ He was still there when the Japanese first bombed Tulagi on 22 January 1942.⁴⁹ Ngwadili worked for the resident commissioner and was involved in capturing seven Japanese soldiers near Afufu, with one soldier turning out to be an important Japanese officer and former spy.⁵⁰ Sergeant Major Jacob Vouza was

also a part of the Solomon Islands Defence Force, and was instructed by Martin Clemens to organise and facilitate a scouting network east of the present-day Honiara. Through this scouting network, Vouza was able to rescue and return an Allied pilot to the United States Marine beachhead at Lunga. Afterwards, he headed back to his village but was captured and interrogated by a Japanese patrol. Vouza agreed to lead the Japanese troops to the Americans, knowing that the Japanese patrol could not match the strength of the US Marine base. The ensuing Battle of Tenaru put the Japanese troops into disarray and gave Vouza the opportunity to escape inside the Allied perimeter. According to Anna Kwai, Vouza's actions precipitated one of the most bloody battles of the Solomon Island campaign, and he received the Silver Star Medal and Legion of Merit from the United States. He also received the George Cross from the United Kingdom.⁵¹

Another key organisation involved in the campaign was the Solomon Islands Labour Force. On 3 December 1942, the first two hundred Islanders were recruited into this organisation. Each section comprised of twenty-five labourers, one of whom served as sergeant. Isaac Gafu was one of the first six sections of Malaitans to join the Labour Force at Auki.⁵² Like many, Gafu joined to earn money labouring, but upon arriving at their encampment on the western bank of Tenaru River, Gafu recalled, "We could not believe what we were seeing as we approached Guadalcanal. Those big steamers and warships were frightening. We were so scared because this was something none of us had experienced before."⁵³ Gafu describes the work in the Labour Force as very heavy, where each day, American soldiers would collect a section of the force. The Labour Force helped to build and repair airfields, unload ammunition and cargo, did laundry, and worked along the coast building wharves and unloading landing crafts. Other sections also helped to guard supply depots at Lungga, Tenaru and Kukum.⁵⁴

During the early stages of the campaign, many sections of the Labour Force served where the action was heaviest, especially if they were tasked with carrying supplies and equipment for the Marines as they advanced. Gafu's most vivid memories are from when the Japanese bombed Lungga, the main camp for the Labour Force: when the first bombing occurring in January 1943, many Islanders were terrified and demanded to go back to Malaita. The second bombing occurred the night of 26 January, with Gafu and other labourers seeking refuge in the river. Gafu and the others returned to camp the next day, with Gafu exclaiming, "We looked and oh, my goodness, our people were dead! The bombs had smashed their heads into pieces and gashed their bodies." Eleven

Malaitans were killed in the attack or later died of their wounds, and nine others were injured, marking the incident as the single greatest loss of life among the Solomon Islands Labour Force.⁵⁵

Collaboration and coercion

Despite the overwhelming support Allied powers received from the Solomon Islanders, as seen in the coastwatching, scout network, Defence Force and Labour Force, many among the people of Buka and the villages on the Bougainville mainland turned pro-Japanese after their subjugation by the enemy. The Japanese organised a propaganda campaign directed towards the Islanders in order to find the location of the Coastwatchers.⁵⁶ Feldt describes how Tashiro, a Japanese soldier who had lived at Bougainville before the war, took on the role of propagandising the Islanders at this time.⁵⁷ Despite the news of Allied success in Guadalcanal and Tulagi, Islanders living in Bougainville saw no change to the local situation except for a greater influx of Japanese troops.⁵⁸ Under Tashiro's ministrations, Islanders in the Kieta area became heavily involved with the Japanese and even formed bands, calling themselves the "Black Dogs", that would raid inland villages seeking to eliminate the remaining Europeans and Chinese civilians on the island.⁵⁹

One such expedition by the Japanese and the Black Dogs was aimed at Mason's group in December 1942.⁶⁰ Mason and his group, camped between Buin and Kieta, were informed in advance by loyal natives of the Japanese plans. Three parties comprised of Japanese troops and the Black Dogs moved in from the coast, one blocking the southern end, one moving to the northern end, and the third striking at Mason's camp. However, they were three days too late, as Mason and his crew had already moved on. Another example of support for the Japanese came with a village near Buka Passage, that handed over friendly Islanders to the Japanese.⁶¹ However, many Islanders in Bougainville assisted the Japanese due to fear and coercion. For example, on Buka Island, all the village chiefs had been summoned to Sohano and presented with special armbands of the Japanese insignia.⁶² However, the chief of Lemankoa Village refused to report to Sohano, whereupon his countrymen carried him there by force, where he was then publicly executed for his disobedience.⁶³ Other chiefs were subjected to public floggings.⁶⁴ As Read states, "[a]lliance was being exhorted by fear rather than by free will."⁶⁵

Another example, that occurred on 20 December 1942 when forty natives left their east coast village near Olava to seek refuge on Rantan Island, shows how the Japanese tried to coerce Solomon Islanders.⁶⁶ When the people of Olava returned to Bougainville, Japanese soldiers visited them on the island and told the natives the

Sadi chief had informed the Japanese that the people of Olava might know where Paul Mason was located.⁶⁷ Locals were offered many benefits of collusion, such as drinking as much whiskey as they wanted without being flogged, but were told they would be annihilated if they refused to disclose Mason's exact position.⁶⁸ The Japanese attempt at coercing information out of the natives did not work, with the people of Olava secretly abandoning Rantan Island afterwards to move towards the Luluai River.⁶⁹

A Solomon Islander who was subjected to such fear and coercion was George Bogese, but who has been regarded by many Solomon Islanders and Kennedy as "just a bloody traitor".⁷⁰ Bogese was from Isabel Island and like Wheatley was a Native Medical Practitioner.⁷¹ In May 1942, Bogese was sent to Savo on the orders of Kennedy to conduct a medical survey, but shortly after arriving at Savo, two barges carrying fifty Japanese troops arrived.⁷² One soldier addressed the village in English, claiming that the rule of Britain was over, and that they were now under Japanese military rule: "Anybody who disobeys Japanese orders must be shot. We proclaim martial law. All natives must cooperate with the Japanese."⁷³ Bogese was too afraid to disobey, and consequently worked as an interpreter for the Japanese, which eventually led to an attack on Kennedy's post and on his boat the *Wai-wai*, which almost killed Solomon Islander and Kennedy's second in command, William (Billy) Bennett.⁷⁴ After the war, Bogese was found guilty of voluntarily joining the Japanese, and was sentenced to four years' imprisonment.⁷⁵

The Solomon Islands Campaign: other impacts

Evidence of devastating impacts on the Solomon Islands' environment was revealed in the war's aftermath. After the British Colonial Office sent a commissioner to the Solomon Islands in 1947 to assess the damage, it was found that on the 62,000 acres of plantation, there was 20-25 per cent damage and universal deterioration.⁷⁶ Businesses, missions, native people and small European planters submitted war damage claims to the commissioner, however it was announced in 1949 that no compensation would be paid to the Solomon Islands.⁷⁷

In regard to marine life, the Solomon Islands have the second highest diversity of coral species in the world, with over 494 coral species and several new species discovered.⁷⁸ The marine life provides the Solomon Islanders with food, with 95 per cent of Solomon Islanders in rural areas relying on subsistence farming and fishing.⁷⁹ During the war, thousands of tons of munitions were hauled to the Pacific Islands, but when the war ended, these munitions and secret chemical weapons were not the

surplus returning ships wanted as cargo.⁸⁰ As a result, munitions were dumped on a huge scale on land and sea, with the biggest land dump near Henderson Field. The dump on Guadalcanal covered some 800 acres and held 20,000 tons of bombs, pyrotechnics, aircraft gun ammunition, bomb fuses and other inert equipment.⁸¹

Many shortcuts were taken when dumping munitions. In theory, unwanted munitions were to be dumped in 50 to 120 fathoms, ten miles or more out from land, but many defective bombs eventually floated to the surface.⁸² In addition, seepage of oil and heavy metals from sunken wartime vessels threatened fisheries, especially as corrosion increased in later years.⁸³ A calculation of 446,517 tons of metal from 111 sunken vessels litters the seabed in just the Iron Bottom Sound alone.⁸⁴ In 1997, the Solomon Islands' Prime Minister, Bartholomew Ulufa'alu, demanded that Allied countries and Japan clear the ships and fighter planes in the Iron Bottom Sound, but such pleas were ignored.⁸⁵

Many other aspects of life were threatened by the presence of these munitions, such as limiting agricultural practice, restricting building of new infrastructure, operating small business, access for tourism, and fishing in contaminated waters.⁸⁶ The resident commissioner estimated that across the Solomon Islands, there were 12,500 acres that needed intensive examination for munitions.⁸⁷ On the southern side of Kolombangara Island, large caches of munitions were stockpiled by the Japanese, ready for invasion, but when the invasion never occurred, the Japanese withdrew and left the ammunition behind.⁸⁸ Locals have tried clearing the vegetation in the hopes of building a new village for about fifty new families, but it is not safe to do.⁸⁹ Despite the destruction of homes and plantations, as well as the threat to marine life due to pollution, neither Japan or America has yet felt obligated to repair any of the damage. In addition, the UK government stated that war damage compensation in the Solomon Islands would depend on the amount of indemnity Japan paid.⁹⁰ Although some efforts have been made by the US and Australia to assist in clearing munitions and bombs in parts of the Solomon Islands, much more remains to be done.

Conclusion

World War II impacted the Solomon Islands in numerous ways. Perhaps most famously, many Solomon Islanders assisted the Allies during the Solomon Island campaign, such as scouting for the Coastwatching network, or fighting as part of the Solomon Islands Defence Force, or carrying supplies in the Solomon Islands Labour

Force. Arguably, without the help of the Solomon Islands during World War II, the Allies would not have been successful in their longer term Pacific campaign against Japan. But in the course of the conflict, the environment of the Solomon Islands changed dramatically due to discarded military machines, explosives and weapons, with considerable environmental consequences.

Notes

- ¹ Anna Annie Kwai, 'Introduction,' in *Solomon Islanders in World War II*, ed. Anna Annie Kwai (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2017), p. 3.
- ² Kwai, 'Introduction,' p. 3.
- ³ Kwai, 'Introduction,' p. 6.
- ⁴ Kwai, 'Introduction,' p. 6.
- ⁵ U.S. Army Military History Institute (Carlisle Barracks, PA), *The Role of Communication Intelligence in the American-Japanese Naval War*, Volume III: The Solomon Islands Campaign, 22 June 1943, p. 52.
- ⁶ Kwai, 'Introduction,' p. 6.
- ⁷ Anna Annie Kwai, 'Islanders at War,' in *Solomon Islanders in World War II*, p. 15.
- ⁸ Gavin Long, 'The Bougainville Campaign Takes Shape,' in *The Final Campaigns*, ed. Gavin Long (Adelaide: Griffin Press, 1963), p. 90.
- ⁹ Kwai, 'Introduction,' p. 6.
- ¹⁰ Kwai, 'Introduction,' p. 6.
- ¹¹ Kwai, 'Islanders at War,' p. 16.
- ¹² Eric A. Feldt, *The Coastwatchers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 4-5.
- ¹³ Feldt, *Coastwatchers*, p. 5.
- ¹⁴ Kwai, 'Islanders at War,' p. 16.
- ¹⁵ Feldt, *Coastwatchers*, p. 6.
- ¹⁶ Kwai, 'Islanders at War,' p. 16.
- ¹⁷ Feldt, *Coastwatchers*, p. 4.
- ¹⁸ Kwai, 'Islanders at War,' p. 19.
- ¹⁹ Kwai, 'Islanders at War,' p. 20.
- ²⁰ Kwai, 'Islanders at War,' p. 18.
- ²¹ James A. Boutilier, 'Kennedy's 'Army': Solomon Islanders at War, 1942-1943,' in *The Pacific Theater: Island Representations of World War II*, eds. Geoffrey M. White and Lamont Lindstrom (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989), p. 336.
- ²² Boutilier, 'Kennedy's 'Army,'" p. 336.

- ²³ Kwai, 'Islanders at War,' p. 18.
- ²⁴ Boutilier, 'Kennedy's 'Army,'" p. 336.
- ²⁵ Kwai, 'Islanders at War,' p. 19; Zaku et al., 'Scouting and Fighting in Santa Isabel,' in *The Big Death: Solomon Islanders Remember World War II*, ed. Geoffrey M. White (Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies and the Solomon Islands Extension Centre, 1988), p. 150.
- ²⁶ Kwai, 'Islanders at War,' p. 19.
- ²⁷ Feldt, *Coastwatchers*, p. 92.
- ²⁸ Kwai, 'Islanders at War,' p. 18.
- ²⁹ Ibid.
- ³⁰ Ibid.
- ³¹ Kwai, 'Islanders at War,' p. 21.
- ³² Kwai, 'Islanders at War,' p. 22.
- ³³ Feldt, *Coastwatchers*, p. 84.
- ³⁴ Feldt, *Coastwatchers*, p. 85.
- ³⁵ Zaku et al., 'Scouting and Fighting in Santa Isabel,' p. 150.
- ³⁶ Kwai, 'Islanders at War,' p. 36.
- ³⁷ Ibid.
- ³⁸ Kwai, 'Islanders at War,' p. 27.
- ³⁹ Kwai, 'Islanders at War,' p. 28.
- ⁴⁰ Feldt, *Coastwatchers*, pp. 34-5.
- ⁴¹ Kwai, 'Islanders at War,' p. 31.
- ⁴² Kwai, 'Islanders at War,' p. 31.
- ⁴³ George Maelalo, 'In the Thick of Fighting,' in *The Big Death: Solomon Islanders Remember World War II*, p. 176.
- ⁴⁴ Maelalo, 'In the Thick of Fighting,' p. 176.
- ⁴⁵ Maelalo, 'In the Thick of Fighting,' p. 177.
- ⁴⁶ Maelalo, 'In the Thick of Fighting,' p. 175.
- ⁴⁷ Maelalo, 'In the Thick of Fighting,' p. 177.
- ⁴⁸ David W. Gegeo and Karen Ann Watson-Gegeo, 'World War II Experience and Life History: Two Cases from Malaita, Solomon Islands,' in *The Pacific Theater: Island Representations of World War II*, p. 356.
- ⁴⁹ Gegeo and Watson-Gegeo, 'World War II Experience,' p. 356.
- ⁵⁰ Gegeo and Watson-Gegeo, 'World War II Experience,' p. 359.
- ⁵¹ Kwai, 'Islanders at War,' pp. 25-6.
- ⁵² Gegeo and Watson-Gegeo, 'World War II Experience,' p. 359.
- ⁵³ Gegeo and Watson-Gegeo, 'World War II Experience,' p. 360.
- ⁵⁴ Gegeo and Watson-Gegeo, 'World War II Experience,' p. 362.
- ⁵⁵ Ibid.
- ⁵⁶ Feldt, *Coastwatchers*, p. 84.
- ⁵⁷ Feldt, *Coastwatchers*, p. 123.
- ⁵⁸ Ibid.
- ⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Feldt, *Coastwatchers*, p. 124.

⁶¹ Feldt, *Coastwatchers*, p. 130.

⁶² Jack Read, 'Coast Watching Activities Began in Earnest, April 19 – August 7, 1942,' in *Coast Watching in World War II: Operations against the Japanese on the Solomon Islands, 1941-43*, ed. A.B. Feuer (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1992), p. 37.

⁶³ Read, 'Coast Watching Activities Began in Earnest,' p. 37.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Paul Mason, 'The Japanese Search for the Southern Bougainville Radio Station: August 8, 1942 – January 1, 1943,' in *Coast Watching in World War II*, p. 105.

⁶⁷ Mason, 'The Japanese Search for the Southern Bougainville Radio Station,' p. 105.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Mason, 'The Japanese Search for the Southern Bougainville Radio Station,' p. 106.

⁷⁰ Hugh Laracy, 'George Bogese (1904-1959): 'Just a bloody traitor,' in *Watriama and Co: Further Pacific Islands Portraits*, ed. Hugh Laracy (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2013), p. 229.

⁷¹ Laracy, 'George Bogese,' p. 229.

⁷² Laracy, 'George Bogese,' p. 231.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Laracy, 'George Bogese,' p. 232.

⁷⁵ Laracy, 'George Bogese,' p. 239.

⁷⁶ Judith A. Bennett, *Natives and Exotics: World War II and Environment in the Southern Pacific* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2009), p. 171.

⁷⁷ Bennett, *Natives and Exotics*, pp. 172-3.